US ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN

July 14, 2008

President Bush has a few serious foreign policy issues beyond the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to deal with before he leaves office. Topping the list are Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs, missile defense agreements with Eastern European countries and Russia’s opposition to them, and what to do about US arms sales to Taiwan. All are problems his successor will inherit. On Iran, North K  orea, and missile defense, Bush has done or is doing about as much as he can do.

On US arms sales to Taiwan, however, he has left much undone. He needs to allow Taiwan to submit a Letter of Request for 60 additional F-16 fighters, and he needs to approve pending sales packages, which the Department of State and the National Security Council (NSC) are holding up, and notify them to Congress before his administration leaves office. Leaving these decisions to the next president could prove to be a monumental mistake.

In 2001, President Bush approved in principal several billion dollars in arms sales to Taiwan. During the eight years of the Chen Shui-bian administration in Taiwan (May 2000-May 2008), however, political infighting between the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the opposition Kuo Min Tang (KMT) held up funding for important arms purchases from the US.

Chen’s Taiwan independence speeches and policies aggravated the situation by angering both the leadership in Beijing and Washington. They angered China's leaders for the obvious reason. They angered Washington's leaders because they threatened US-China relations at a time when the US needed China’s help with North Korea at the Six Party Talks and US efforts to impose sanctions on Iran at the UN. US arms sales to the Chen administration, Beijing argued, only strengthened Chen's hand.

The damage those eight years did to the US-Taiwan relationship is incalculable. Taiwan’s relative military capabilities fell further behind as important Taiwan military acquisitions were postponed. China, however, pursued rapid military modernization with purchases of advanced weapons from the Soviet Union and increased funding for its own military research and development programs.

More important, a fundamental bond between the US and the Republic of China, developed over decades before and after the break in formal diplomatic relations, appears to have been permanently weakened. Not because of a reduction in arms sales, but because US leaders lost confidence in Taiwan leaders at a time when the United States was becoming increasingly dependent on improved US-China relations.

Nevertheless, the election of President Ma Ying-jeou in March provided opportunities for Taiwan, China, and the United States. Taiwan’s attitudes toward China took a sharp turn toward conciliation, and China responded. Since Ma took office in May, a constant stream of news stories have come out of Taipei and Beijing about contacts between the two and various agreements they have reached on direct flights, communications, travel to Taiwan by mainland tourists, and various other issues.

With Chen Shui-bian out of office and with the KMT dominated Legislative Yuan’s passage of a defense budget before he departed that funded major purchases of US arms, domestic Taiwan impediments to US arms sales to Taiwan were removed. The Bush administration could have taken advantage of the situation to move pending arms sales forward, but it hasn't.

Moving forward with them now most certainly will anger Beijing more than previous arms sales. China has come to believe that its cooperation with the US, albeit out of its own self interest, is largely responsible for the US "reduction" in arms sales to Taiwan. It's difficult to predict precisely how Beijing would react.

US officials are understandably concerned about China's reaction. Many US officials also fear major US arms sales now would undermine Taiwan-China détente. On the surface, at least, what the United States has insisted on for the past 28 years--that China and Taiwan resolve their differences peacefully-- appears to be happening. Why, they ask, does Taiwan need more F-16 fighters, Patriot PAC III missiles, Apache and Blackhawk helicopters, and other weapons packages now?  

So why should President Bush move swiftly on Taiwan arms sales? Why not let the next US President address this issue?

The answers to these questions are simple; because the China-Taiwan honeymoon won’t last long, and because Taiwan must negotiate with China from a position of strength not weakness. In the words of Fredrick the Great, “Negotiations without arms are like notes without instruments.”

President Ma himself recognizes this and wants the US to respond expeditiously to Taiwan’s requests. He also knows that the 40+ percent of the citizens of Taiwan who did not vote for him do not approve of his overtures to China and distrust his motives. He needs US arms to counter that perception.

If Bush fails to move forward on arms sales to Taiwan, he will be telling Beijing that they can demand more and give less in their dealings with Taiwan, believing that Taiwan has little choice but to keep Beijing happy. If Ma wants to be reelected four years from now, his policy of détente with China has to be a success.

Whoever becomes our next president, it will take months, if not a year or more for their administration to sort out their China/Taiwan policies. Democratic and Republican administrations have supported arms sales to Taiwan over the years, but China has more leverage with the US now than ever before as it finances our debt and cooperates on difficult foreign policy issues. China will subject an Obama or a McCain administration to immense pressure not to sell arms to Taiwan, making their task exponentially more difficult.

As Taiwan enters this challenging period of détente with China, it needs strong US moral and material support more than ever. By taking action on US arms sales to Taiwan before he leaves office, President Bush makes it much easier for his successor to withstand pressure from Beijing as arms sales contracts are concluded and weapons systems are delivered. He demonstrates clearly that, while the US supports Taiwan-China détente, it stands firmly behind Taiwan democracy.

Finally, it all comes down to this. Should Taiwan democracy ultimately be weakened by a Taiwan accommodation with China because it lacked the strength to resist it, the US will have sacrificed it's fundamental belief in democracy for all on the altar of short-term expediency. No US president wants that as part of his legacy.