As Secretary of State Hillary Clinton headed for China, the Pentagon announced that the US-China Defense Consultative Talks, suspended by Beijing last December when the Bush administration announced a $6.4 billion arms package for Taiwan, will resume later this month. The US Department of Defense will resume its 30-year quest for access and influence. The People’s Liberation Army will resume its 60-year practice of reciprocity--We expect that you will be forthcoming. You can expect that we will expect you will be forthcoming.

In 1982, when Brigadier General Bernard Loeffke prepared to depart for his new post as the defense attaché to the People’s Republic of China, he called on US Army Chief of Staff General Edward “Shy” Meyer, a Korean War veteran. Meyer’s parting admonition to Loeffke was, “Bernie, make sure we never have to go to war with those guys”--about as good a rationale for US-China military engagement as you can get. The Department of Defense in five administrations from Jimmy Carter’s to George W. Bush’s pursued that objective.

Since the US hasn’t gone to war with China lately and US-China relations have improved in recent years, one might conclude that US-China military engagement has been a great success. And if these are the only metrics by which bilateral military engagement is measured, it has been.

At the same time, China suspends military engagement and other bilateral activities in attempts to reduce, if not stop, US arms sales to Taiwan, as it did when the Bush administration announced the $6.4 billion package. China threatens even worse when it believes the US has yet to make a final decision on an arms sale. Democratic and Republican administrations have become so concerned about China’s reaction that they have routinely delayed arms sales and sometimes denied Taiwan's requests altogether.

China’s principal concern, however, is not Taiwan’s military capability. It seeks to wean Taiwan from dependence on the US for its defense needs and coerce Taiwan--gently if possible, with a heavy hand if necessary--back into the fold. China-Taiwan economic relations have been growing for many years. Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou has made China-Taiwan détente the centerpiece of his administration. Many in Taiwan and the US now see US arms sales to Taiwan as less critical to Taiwan’s security than they previously were.

For its part, the US military greatly values military exchanges with the PLA. Since the first US ship visit to China after the improvement in relations in the mid-1980s, US Pacific Command has relished ship visits to Chinese ports. China is a top destination for War College and general/flag officer CAPSTONE courses and a host of other mid- and high-level military delegations.

The consistent complaint, however, has been the differences in American and Chinese definitions of reciprocity. The US believes that China should grant it the same treatment and access it accords China. China believes it should treat the US as it treats any other country. This disparity has led to frustration for those responsible for managing US-China military engagement; and it has provided China access it has not reciprocated.

Because US civilian and military leaders come and go with greater frequency than their Chinese counterparts, thousands of Americans have participated in US-China military engagement over the past three decades. Novices tend to believe the more forthcoming they are with the Chinese the more forthcoming the Chinese will be with them. Old hands who have accompanied a first-time senior visitor to China understand the phenomena. The Chinese, who have been dealing with barbarians in the middle kingdom for millennia, simply smile and think, “Here comes another one.”

Fortunately, after three decades there are many Democrats and Republicans experienced in dealing with the PLA. Kurt Campbell, prospective Assistant Secretary of State for Asia-Pacific Affairs, served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia-Pacific Affairs under Bill Clinton. Campbell's former deputy, retired Marine Corps Lieutenant General Wallace “Chip” Gregson, appears likely to become the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia-Pacific Security Affairs. None of this is new to them.

As the Obama administration begins to write the next chapter in the saga of US-China military engagement, however, it should ask itself if it is content to follow the established pattern or adopt a different approach. The US has allowed itself to become dependent on China to lend us money and help with North Korea, giving Beijing considerable leverage. One-sided military engagement only gives them more.

It's premature to conclude that China-Taiwan détente will lead to a quick resolution of the Taiwan issue. The Ma administration may or may not self-limit its arms requests as it pursues détente with China, but US arms sales to Taiwan will continue for the foreseeable future. The US should stop allowing concern for China's reaction to dictate the level or pace of those arms sales. China's military threat to the island and Taiwan's legitimate defense requirements should determine what the US provides Taiwan and when it provides it as required by the Taiwan Relations Act.

If US-China military engagement is mutually beneficial then China's limiting it to affect a change in US Taiwan arms sales policy is self-defeating. If it’s not mutually beneficial, it is destined to falter and not worth the US risking Taiwan’s security over. US officials should make it clear to their counterparts that they support China-Taiwan détente, but so long as China arrays its ballistic missiles and forces along the Taiwan Strait the US intends to fulfill its legal and moral obligations to Taiwan. Unless the US abandons those obligations, which isn't likely, China’s reaction to them simply perpetuates the on-again-off-again pattern of the past 30 years.

US policy officials also should place the premium in military engagement with China on serious and meaningful high-level dialogue (at the assistant secretary level and above) on regional and global security issues. The US record of success here, like the military relationship itself, is spotty. The lure of interaction with China for interaction’s sake undercuts this and provides less incentive for the Chinese to engage in meaningful dialogue. Military exchanges are fine, but they are no substitute for frank, high-level dialogue on a broad range of important issues.

Chinese leaders are sizing up the new US administration, as they have those that preceded it. They’ll test and probe it to determine on what issues it will stand fast and on what issues it will bend. The sooner the US lets China know that it’s more interested in substance than form and that it won’t compromise on Taiwan, the sooner it can get down to meaningful, mutually beneficial engagement.