The 29-page document, dated June 2008, completes the shift from deterring and defeating more traditional military threats from countries like Russia and China as DoD’s top priority to countering the threats from terrorists and rogue states begun under Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.

After seven years of war in Afghanistan and five years of war in Iraq, it represents the most recent evolution of the strategy debate ongoing in the Pentagon since 9/11. Reinforced by General David Petraeus’ success in Iraq and Secretary Bob Gates’ leadership at DoD, it’s an important document. In an election year, however, it is unlikely to get the attention from the American people it deserves.

The NDS is important not only because of its shift in focus, but because it acknowledges that US military force alone is insufficient to meet the multiple and complex challenges terrorists and rogue states like North Korea and Iran present. It asserts the need to use “diplomacy and soft power to shape the behavior of individual states and the international system.” And it restates what the Pentagon for some time now has practiced--building “partnership capacity” to combat the growth and spread of international terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda and deprive them of safe havens.

Who can argue that training and equipping to fight asymmetric wars and prevent terrorist attacks on the United States using all elements of US national power should not be a top priority? But how many more wars like Iraq and Afghanistan are we likely to fight?

The war in Iraq is essentially won. Over the next two to three years we will reduce our forces there and deploy them to Afghanistan where we can apply the lessons learned in Iraq. If we can defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, and keep them tightly bottled up in the tribal areas of Pakistan, will they continue to threaten us as they have in the past? Will we find ourselves poised to fight the next big counterinsurgency that never materializes?

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and another 9/11-style attack on the United States will remain principal threats to US national security for the indefinite future. What do we do, however, if we are unable to prevent Iran and other rogue countries from producing nuclear weapons through peaceful means? What kind of war will we fight if the use of military force becomes the only option?

And what about China and Russia? The NDS acknowledges the rapid rise of China's military capabilities and the resurgence of Russia, but it downplays those threats and states that the United States should build "collaborative and cooperative relationships with them” through “engagement.”

Whether or not this represents an enlightened understanding of China’s and Russia’s intentions or simply wishful thinking is debatable. Certainly the United States cannot effectively contain Russia and China, Cold War style, while simultaneously combating extremists and rogue states and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. To do that, we need Moscow’s and Beijing’s help.

To this end, the US has continued to seek improved relations with Moscow despite Moscow's new military assertiveness and outspoken opposition to US missile defense agreements with Eastern European countries. And President Bush has worked hard for the past several years to improve relations with China. He has even been reluctant to follow through on arms sales commitments to Taiwan out of a desire not to anger Beijing.

The results of US efforts to improve military engagement with Russia and China have been mixed, especially with China. The Pentagon has consistently been more forthcoming than the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and overly optimistic about what it can accomplish. The PLA hasn’t practiced reciprocity, as we define it, and continues to build a military capability to take Taiwan by force despite recent Taiwan-China détente. The US sees engagement as a means of building mutual understanding and mitigating the threat. China sees engagement as a means of better understanding its adversary and how to defeat it.

If Russia and China do not present significant future military threats to US interests, seeking collaboration and cooperation is a wise course. How they are likely to behave in a future world competing for limited energy resources where the US ability to project conventional military power may be reduced, however, is another matter. Their long term strategies, now and for the foreseeable future, are to develop capabilities to counter the United States.

The US will by no means abandon its conventional military force. Gates pointed to strong congressional support for procurement and research and development programs to sustain it.  Carrier battle groups, squadrons of F-22s fighters and B-2 bombers, and armored brigades will continue to train and deploy to meet crises in the Taiwan Strait, on the Korean Peninsula, Iran or wherever they might occur.

Nevertheless, it’s the new NDS’s impact on future defense budgets and procurements over time that we need to be concerned about. Should the next US administration adopt it, with all the pressure on the US budget, by necessity it would sooner or later result in the reduction of US conventional military capabilities as funds are diverted to other priorities.

Already in recent years we’ve seen the reduction in planned procurement of F-22 fighters, advanced combat ships, and other expensive conventional weapons platforms. Production lines for advanced fighters, tanks, and combat ships, once closed down are extremely difficult and expensive to reopen. Conventional capabilities, once forfeited or degraded, can’t be quickly regained.

Secretary Gates said if there was one word that describes the NDS, it’s “balance.” On balance, the NDS is a good document that lays out a strategy for dealing with the complex environment and threats America faces. We can adjust it as necessary. Now let’s hear what Barack Obama and John McCain have to say about it before Election Day.