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THE MILITARIZATION OF US FOREIGN POLICY

"It Really Is in Our DNA"

February 16, 2009

Speaking at the Nixon Center last month Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, addressed the decades-long militarization of American foreign policy. He reiterated Secretary Robert Gate’s call for an increase in resources for State, USAID, Agriculture, Justice and Commerce so they can assume leadership in areas of foreign policy execution where the military has taken the lead. “Yes, our military is flexible. Well-funded. Designed to take risks. We respond well to orders from civilian authorities. It’s what we do. It really is part of our DNA. I believe we should be more willing to break this cycle and say when Armed Forces may not always be the best choice to take the lead."

Mullen’s absolutely right when he says that it’s in our DNA. We inherited the gene from a long line of military leaders down through history who have been making and executing foreign policy since the beginning of time. Until American democracy came along, civilian control of the military and foreign ministers making and executing foreign policy, not dominated by the military, was the exception.

The current trend began with the military occupations of Germany and Japan after World War II. Under the leadership of Generals Douglas MacArthur and Dwight Eisenhower the US Armed Forces simply did what no one else in the American government was capable of doing. MacArthur and a small staff even wrote the Japanese constitution. MacArthur crossed the line in Korea, and President Harry Truman fired him, but that doesn’t diminish all that he and others like him, before and since, have accomplished in the foreign policy arena.

Today, in the tradition of MacArthur and Eisenhower, people like General David Petraeus, Admiral Mullen, and a long list of generals, admirals, and field-grade officers with advanced degrees and years of international experience distinguish themselves with extra-military achievements. Petraeus has a PhD in international relations from Princeton. Petraeus, Mullen, and other senior officers routinely find themselves at the forefront of foreign policy activities. The officers and troops under them are the world’s first responders for everything from aggression to tsunamis. They advise governments, negotiate alliances, and make the trains run on time.

Like Mullen, I came along during the Vietnam War, when neither the military under General William Westmoreland nor civilians were managing our military or foreign policy in Southeast Asia all that well. There were plenty of Foreign Services Officers (FSOs) and other government agency people around then in the hamlets and villages of South Vietnam. Over my 40-plus years in government I’ve developed a deep and lasting respect for FSOs. Without them America wouldn’t have a foreign policy. Nevertheless, it was their and other government agencies' reactions to the Vietnam experience and it's aftermath that likely dampened their enthusiasm for “nation building” in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. Recall the negative response many FSOs had when Secretary Condoleezza Rice called for volunteers to serve in Iraq.

Vietnam, however, taught the military establishment important lessons. One of those lessons was that when it participated in foreign policy decision making and execution, the strategic thinking of the best and the brightest wasn't enough. It had to be grounded in common sense, a thorough understanding of the real-world, and the ability to make things happen. Making things happen is what the military is all about.

The American public got its first close-up look at the new US military during the first Gulf War. Unlike in Vietnam, President George H. W. Bush gave the order then got out of the way and let the military do its thing. It built a broad international coalition, applied overwhelming force, and won a quick and decisive victory.

From 1983 to 1989, it was the US-China military relationship that opened the door to better US-China relations, provided a channel of communications to China’s predominantly military leadership, and played a role in winning the Cold War. All the while, the Department of Defense (DoD) armed Taiwan, finding creative ways to bolster the island’s defenses and maintain the delicate military balance in the Taiwan Strait without allowing US arms sales to Taiwan to derail US-China relations.

In the early 1990s, it was US Pacific Command’s operations to recover the remains of US servicemen missing from the Vietnam War, and DoD's back-channel communications with the Vietnamese military that led to lifting the trade embargo on Vietnam and ultimately the normalization of diplomatic relations.

In Iraq, it was General Petraeus' counterinsurgency strategy, the US military’s skill in dealing with Sunnis and Shiites, and the troop surge that broke al-Qaeda’s back in Iraq. We spent four years repeating the mistakes of Vietnam before Gates and Petraeus came along; unfortunately, our leaders sometimes ignore the lessons of history.

These are just a few examples. There are many others. The DoD and the US Armed Forces certainly didn’t achieve these successes alone. We worked hand in hand with US embassies, the State Department, and other government agencies. But now, wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and other commitments around the world have stretched the US military thin. And as Gates and Mullen have indicated, they welcome other agencies relieving some of the pressure.

Congress should increase State’s and other agencies' budgets so they can hire more people and send them to Iraq, Afghanistan, and wherever they are needed. They should have done that years ago; but government’s reaction to terrorist attacks against US targets in the Middle East, Africa, and in the US on 9/11 was to reduce US government civilian exposure overseas, not increase it. As Mullen indicated it will take a decade or more to recruit, train, and deploy other agencies' people to where they need to be.

Before our expectations get away from us, however, we should keep three things in mind. First, the world has become an increasingly dangerous place. You don’t have to watch or read about terrorists beheading or shooting too many civilian contractors or USAID officials before you get the idea it’s not safe out there. So it should surprise no one that people in uniform who carry guns end up doing many jobs. While the government is throwing billions of dollars around, we should increase the size of the military. All those civilians are going to need protection.

Second, let’s not overreact. The US military, with its civilian leaders and policy officials, is an institution like none other that has ever existed. There’s a reason Americans have elected 30 military men, overwhelmingly generals, to the presidency. Our system of government protects us from would-be Napoleons. And there’s a reason the US military establishment is the most respected institution in America.

Finally, foreign policy is just too important to be left to the diplomats.

 

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