THE FUTURE OF US-TAIWAN RELATIONS

February 25, 2008 

While most Americans are preoccupied with US presidential politics, China/Taiwan watchers are following another presidential election in Taiwan.  On Saturday, March 22, 2008, the Taiwan people will vote to elect either Kuomintang (KMT) Party candidate Ma Ying-jeou or Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Candidate Hsieh Chang-ting to succeed DPP President Chen Shui-bian.  Regardless of the outcome, it can only accelerate the ongoing change in the US-Taiwan relationship that began when President Chen took office in May 2000.  Whether that change ultimately enhances or erodes Taiwan's security depends on both the next President of Taiwan and the next President of the United States.

For the 29 years since the United States severed formal diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (ROC) and recognized the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the constant in US-Taiwan relations has been the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979.  Section 3 (a) states, “The United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.”

Despite Beijing's protests over the years, the US has provided Taiwan with a steady supply of weapons, training, and technical assistance intended to maintain the relative military balance in the Taiwan Strait.  Individual arms sales frequently have been the subject of intense debate inside the US Government.  And many have been denied or delayed because of US concerns about their necessity or the PRC reaction.  Nevertheless, the US has been Taiwan's sole reliable arms supplier, and both the US and Taiwan have focused on the transfer of meaningful defense capabilities not just hardware. 

At the same time, since 1979, four US presidents, either by their words or their actions, have signaled their willingness to come to Taiwan's defense with US military force.  When China test fired ballistic missiles toward Taiwan in 1996 President Clinton deployed a carrier battle group to the Taiwan Strait region.   The consistent message to Beijing has always been clear.  A military conflict with Taiwan would lead to a conflict with the United States.

Beijing never doubted it.  As they arrayed hundreds of short and medium range ballistic missiles along the coast of China opposite Taiwan, they sought the capability to strike US carrier battle groups that would come to Taiwan's defense in the event of a conflict.

For the past eight years, however, the US-Taiwan relationship has been undergoing an inevitable change brought about by democracy in Taiwan and a change in strategic imperatives for the US.  Where that change will lead is difficult to predict, but a failure to effectively adapt to it could prove dangerous for both the US and Taiwan.

In Taiwan, a democratically elected Chen Shui-bian pursued policies intended to move Taiwan toward independence and programs that the Bush Administration disapproved of.  They conflicted with America's and China's one-China policies and Bush Administration ideas about how Taiwan should behave.  They angered Beijing and put Chen at odds with Washington.  

The Bush Administration had come to office willing to substantially increase arms sales to Taiwan and approved a number of new programs in April 2001.  However, partisan battles in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan over the defense budget and Washington’s displeasure with Chen resulted in a significant decrease in US arms transfers to Taiwan during Chen’s term.

The US, following 9/11, found itself facing a global threat from al-Qaeda, engaged in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and had to cope with nuclear weapons programs in North Korea and Iraq.  It became economically and politically dependent on maintaining a good US-China relationship.  China now holds vast foreign exchange reserves and US debt, and it is important to the US strategy for curtailing North Korean and Iranian nuclear weapons development and proliferation. 

A month before Taiwan's presidential election, and just over eight months to Election Day in the US, both the US and Taiwan now face new realities.  If Hsieh wins and continues to move toward Taiwan independence, he will place further strains on US-Taiwan relations.  How would the new US administration react?  Is it any more likely to dissuade Hsieh from pursuing a policy he believes he has a mandate to pursue than it was with Chen?

But Hsieh, trailing in recent opinion polls, faces an uphill battle against Ma, who is running on a platform of détente with Beijing.  Ma, in a January 16 speech, proposed negotiations with Beijing to normalize economic relations, conclude a peace agreement to terminate hostilities in the Taiwan Strait, and reach agreement allowing Taiwan more “international space.”  Ma also stated that his administration would pursue the “three no’s”: no negotiations for unification, no pursuit of de jure independence, and no use of force by either side of the Taiwan Strait.

Considering the numbers of Taiwan citizens now doing business in China and believing that Taiwan, in any event, could not defend itself against a determined PRC attack, many KMT leaders believe it makes little sense to spend billions on military capabilities that only provoke Beijing.  Ma himself has indicated that if elected he will do a bottom’s up review of Taiwan's defense requirements with preference for strictly “defense” systems.

Taken at face value, Ma’s policies appear to be what the US has desired since 1979—for the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait to peacefully resolve their differences.  History, however, has taught us that any negotiations with Beijing are fraught with difficulty and are intended to achieve its political objectives, not compromise.  And if Ma wins and sets Taiwan on a path of negotiations with the PRC but allows Taiwan's military capabilities to further deteriorate, making Taipei vulnerable to coercion from Beijing, how would the new US Administration react? 

In either case, as Taiwan looks beyond the US to the hope and promise of independence or to China to secure its future, will America's past willingness to defend Taiwan, should Beijing use military force, be as strong 3, 5, or 10 years from now as it has been in the past?  Whether Hsieh or Ma becomes president these are all important questions the next President of Taiwan and the next President of the United States must ask.

Regardless who becomes the next US President, the US will continue to pursue a one-China policy.  Both Democrats and Republicans are fully invested in it.  Within that policy, however, the US has much room for maneuver.  To cope with the changing times, the next US Administration should take advantage of that room and do three things.

First, it must raise the level of dialogue between the US and Taiwan to the highest levels.  To maintain the façade of unofficiality, since 1979 Washington has severely limited the channels of communication with Taipei.  To be sure, those channels have worked well within their limits, but they have proven insufficient to cope with the dynamics of Taiwan's domestic politics.  Treating the democratically elected president of 23 million people on Taiwan as a non-person serves no purpose.

Second, the new US and Taiwan administrations must quickly reach agreement on Taiwan's required military capabilities and the weapon systems necessary to maintain those capabilities.  Differences of opinion, both within the Taiwan and US governments, resulted in slowing the improvement in Taiwan’s military capabilities during the Chen years.  If Taiwan is to deal with China from a position of strength, the US and Taiwan must move expeditiously to make up for lost time.

Third, the US must not allow Beijing or its concern for Beijing's reaction to dictate the release or timing of US arms sales to Taiwan.  The more Beijing perceives its pressure on the US is working, as it now believes, the higher it will raise the stakes.  As a measure of good will, and to give the next US President breathing room and a level playing field, the Bush Administration should move expeditiously after the Taiwan election to approve the sale of F-16C/Ds to Taiwan, the Beijing Olympics notwithstanding.

As the next US and Taiwan presidents take office, their words and actions will set the tone for US-Taiwan relations in the years to come.  They must move decisively and expeditiously to put US-Taiwan relations back on a solid foundation that recognizes the voice of the Taiwan people through its elected representatives and the strategic realities the US and Taiwan must operate within.  That’s what the people of Taiwan and the people of the United States elect their leaders to do.