Why have President Obama’s approaches to dealing with captured terrorists and terrorists operating in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen been fundamentally inconsistent? On one battlefield he concedes the advantage to the enemy. On the others, he gives them no quarter.

President Obama is moving to close Guantanamo, investigate CIA interrogators, and give full constitutional protections to captured terrorists. He still hasn’t set up the High-value Detainee Interrogation Group he announced in August.

Trying captured terrorists in US courts instead of military tribunals especially baffles his critics. By trying Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) and his four 9/11 co-conspirators in a civilian court in the US, something Obama says he still wants to do even if not in New York City, he gives al-Qaeda a propaganda goldmine. By reading Christmas-Day, underwear-bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab his Miranda rights, he precludes proper intelligence interrogation obtaining actionable intelligence.

At the same time, he sends 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan, attacks Taliban and al-Qaeda high-value targets in Pakistan with drones, conducts a covert war there against Islamic extremists, and he attacks al-Qaeda in Yemen with cruise missiles.

Exceptionally good intelligence on the whereabouts of high-value targets and sophisticated and sensitive means for precisely targeting them has made drone and cruise-missile attacks very effective. Still, they frequently kill civilians in the process.

The recent killing of three American soldiers in a suicide bombing in the town of Dir revealed that America’s war in Pakistan not only involves drones but also teams of special operations soldiers. They are often necessary to obtain the intelligence and targeting information required.

In December, the cruise missile attack in Yemen reportedly killed 25 al-Qaeda operatives, although it also may have killed as many as 63 civilians.

President Obama appears to be more concerned with the rights of terrorists like Mohammed and Abdulmutallab than with those of the Pakistani and Yemeni civilians that are killed or wounded in drone and cruise-missile attacks.

There are several possible explanations as to why President Obama’s counterterrorism policies at home and abroad are inconsistent.

The first, and the one least complimentary to President Obama, is politics. As Commander-in-Chief, he knows he has to act decisively in Afghanistan and Pakistan. But by standing up for the “rights” of captured terrorists, he accedes to liberal’s demands on the issues they criticized George W. Bush about most. The number of liberals who complained about US involvement in Afghanistan is far smaller than those that complained about Guantanamo and “torture.”

While President Obama’s harshest critics would certainly buy this explanation, even if it’s only partially true, it’s far too simplistic for a complex situation.

A second, and somewhat more plausible, explanation is the different policies reflect the different people advising him on related but two different sets of issues. On Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, National Security Advisor, General USMC (Ret.) James Jones, US Central Command Commander David Petraeus, and US Forces Afghanistan Commander Stanley McChrystal are all seasoned national-security professionals with little concern for politics. They’ve obviously succeeded at convincing the president that the strategy and tactics they’re using are necessary to win in Afghanistan, prevent a government collapse in Pakistan, and preempt attacks from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

On the domestic front Attorney General Eric Holder, Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel, and Political advisor David Axelrod, are a different lot. All are committed liberals and political players in Washington, DC. Holder in particular holds strong views on how captured terrorists should be treated; and they all are far more in tune with and susceptible to pressure from the Democrat left. Although Emanuel recently has been at odds with Holder on civilian trials for terrorists, his views are more a practical reaction to political losses in Virginia, New Jersey, and Massachusetts than they are ideological.

We should include counterterrorism advisor John Brennan with this group, but he doesn't fit the mold. Nevertheless, he has been an outspoken advocate for the president and Holder on how Abdulmutallab was handled.

This explanation also reflects negatively on the president. It suggests that Commander-in-Chief Obama is easily swayed by his advisors and, if true, demonstrates his inexperience in national security affairs. It suggests that the president doesn’t have a mind of his own.

A third explanation, one as complex as the inner workings of the President’s scholarly liberal mind, is that he sees no contradictions in what he’s doing on the battlefields of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen and what he’s attempting to do in US courtrooms at home. He’s pursuing the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan and terrorists in Yemen as best he believes he can while living up to his campaign promises to close Guantanamo and overturn George W. Bush’s policies on interrogations and military tribunals. He’ll defeat Taliban and al-Qaeda in the “necessary war” while “restoring American values” in the eyes of liberals and the world. Doing the latter, he firmly believes, will make it easier for him to do the former.

The problem with the president’s approach on captured terrorists, whatever the explanation, is that it is increasingly unpopular with the overwhelming majority of the American people, as demonstrated by Senator Scott Brown’s victory in Massachusetts. And it’s one successful terrorist attack in the United States away from conclusively proving to have been a huge mistake--a reality President Obama may be coming to grips with.

President Obama has already begun to reverse himself on KSM’s trial in New York, and it’s apparent that there’s increasing dissention within his own ranks about what should have been done with Abdulmutallab. Whatever reasons have motivated President Obama to pursue inconsistent policies, and whether he changes them because of politics, because he listens to different advisors, or because of his own logic, he and the country will be better off.